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circumstances, bearing in mind the dangers of the business. Third, it is
erroneous to charge that the care in such a case would be the care exercised by
those persons who are engaged in the business of operating such special
machinery for the same or similar purposes.
In Wellman v. East Ohzo Gas Co. 1 the supreme court was concerned
with the liability of an owner of the premises to the employees of an inde-
pendent contractor who was engaged to perform services upon such
premises. While recognizing that the owner may be chargeable with
actionable negligence in failing to remove a dangerous condition or give
notice or warning of its existence where they are created by or within his
knowledge and the independent contractor and his employees enter upon
the premises unaware and uninformed,'12 the court states that this rule does
not apply to work the very doing of which involves elements of real or
potential danger.
Another case involved a question as to how far consent or acquiescence
or requests of manual laborers hired by the plaintiff could be chargeable to
their employer. Under the facts the laborers were engaged in spreading
ready-mix concrete delivered by the defendant, and it was they who directed
the defendant's driver to run his heavy truck upon freshly constructed con-
crete runways, thereby destroying them. It was held that their implied au-
thority did not extend to permitting the destruction of the driveway. Even if
the manual laborers had authority to direct delivery if it could be done
without damage to the property, there could be no reliance on their directions
because the defendant, knowing that the driveway probably would be dam-
aged by his conduct, could not have relied on such apparent authority."
MAURICE S. CULP
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The new Ohio Revised Code, which became effective October 1, 1953,
contains the following new or amended sections affecting appellate practice,
all of which apply to pending cases:
Section 2321.17 (Ohio General Code Section 11575) now defines a
new trial as a re-examination of the issues instead of a re-examination of
an issue of fact. Section 2321.01 (Ohio General Code Section 11576-1 as
11160 Ohio St. 103, 113 N.E.2d 629 (1953)
'The existence of such a duty has been recognized in many Ohio cases, including
the following: Bosjnak v. Superior Sheet Steel Co., 145 Ohio St. 538, 62 N.E.2d
305 (1945); Davis v. Charles Shutrump & Sons Co., 140 Ohio St. 89, 42 N.E.2d
663 (1942); Hozian v. The Crucible Steel Casting Co., 132 Ohio St. 453, 9 N.E.2d
143 (1937).
"Kirschner v. Richter Concrete Corp., 93 Ohio App. 422, 113 N.E.2d 649 (1952)
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amended) provides that a motion for a new trial is not necessary as a pre-
requisite to obtain appellate review of weight of evidence where such evi-
dence appears as a part of the record in the appellate court.
Section 2323.19 (Ohio General Code Section 11601-1 as amended)
provides for the same stay of execution for a motion notwithstanding the
verdict as for a motion for new trial.
Section 2323.181 outlines procedure to be followed if both a motion for
new trial and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are filed
following entry of a jury verdict or an entry discharging the jury in the
event of disagreement.
Section 2323.18 amends Ohio General Code Section 11601 and provides
for the filing of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in cases
where the jury has failed to reach a verdict, as well as in the cases where a
verdict has been reached.
Section 2323.15 amends Ohio General Code Section 11599 and removes
the provision that the filing of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict holds up the filing of the judgment entry upon the return of the ver-
dict. This motion is now filed after the filing of the judgment entry in-
stead of prior to such filing.
Section 2505.07 amends Ohio General Code Section 12223-7 to provide
that when a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a motion
for new trial is filed within the time provided by Sections 2323.181 and
2321.19 the time for perfecting the appeal shall not begin to run, and no
appeal shall be taken, until the entry of the order on the motion, and if both
motions are filed, then, not until the entry of the order on the last of such
motions decided.
Section 2945.65 (Ohio General Code Section 13445-1) referring to
criminal cases, has been amended to provide that in case a. defendant is
granted leave to appeal, the court shall fix the time within which a bill of
exceptions shall be filed, not to exceed thirty days from the order granting
such leave.
Apparently inspired by the holding of the supreme court in the case of
Corn v. Board of Liquor Control,' the General Assembly, late in its last
session, amended the Administrative Procedure Act by making provision in
Ohio Revised Code, Section 119.21, for the allowance of appeal to those
agencies covered by the Act. However, this section does not affect zoning
boards, and, in the absence of further legislation, such boards must continue
without benefit of review from judicial decisions unfavorable to them.
A number of definitive cases affecting Ohio Appellate Procedure were
reported during 1953. Space limitations confine comment to only a few
of the more outstanding.
'160 Ohio St. 9, 113 N.E.2d 360 (1953).
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In Fielder v. Edison Co.,/ the Ohio Supreme Court, with three members
dissenting in part, held that where an administrator's cause of action for pain
and suffering of a decedent, improperly joined with a cause of action for
decedent's wrongful death, resulted in a judgment for defendant on the first
cause but against the defendant on the second 'cause, the misjomder of
causes of action tainted the entire verdict and judgment and required the
reversal of the entire judgment.
Several bothersome questions growing out of the application of Ohio
Revised Code Section 2703.04 (Ohio General Code Section 11282) were
decided by a unanimous court in Glass v. Transfer Co.,3 upon the basis that
where a trial court, pursuant to motion by a defendant, has dismissed an ac-
tion against such defendant for want of jurisdiction of such defendant's per-
son, the trial court having already directed a verdict as to other defendants
joined as alleged tort-feasors, it is error for the court of appeals to further
consider the merits of the action and render final judgment in favor of such
defendant, since that court should have merely dismissed for want of juris-
diction.
In State v. Nickles,4 the supreme court held that Ohio Revised Code
Section 2505.04 (Ohio General Code Section 12223-4) being a section of
the procedural statutes governing appeal, is applicable to criminal as well
as civil cases and that, therefore, Ohio Revised Code Section 2953.04 (Ohio
General Code Section 13459-3) providing for the filing of the brief of
appellant in a criminal case, is merely directory, and that the extension of
time for filing briefs is within the sound discretion of the court. It is sub-
mitted that the discussion in this opinion is another step in the right direc-
tion toward following the intent of the General Assembly in its legislative
attempts to achieve orderly appellate review.
The situation presented in the two companion cases reported as Corn v.
Board of Liquor Control5 grew out of two orders by the Board, including
one made in an appeal from the finding of the Director of Liquor Control
which rejected the plaintiff's applications for renewal of permits under the
provisions of applicable sections of the Administrative Procedure Act. The
permit-holder appealed the orders to the Court of Common Pleas of Frank-
lin County, which reversed the Board's orders, the Director thereafter ap-
pealing to the court of appeals for that county, which court in turn reversed
the judgments of the common pleas court. The supreme court held that
neither the Board, the Department, nor the Director has authority to appeal
from the judgment of the court of common pleas in this situation, and that,
2158 Ohio St. 375, 109 N.E.2d 855 (1952).
159 Ohio St. 505, 112 N.E.2d 823 (1953)
159 Ohio St. 353, 112 N.E.2d 531 (1953)
'160 Ohio St. 9, 113 N.E.2d 360 (1953)
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although a person has an inherent and inalienable right to fair and impartial
hearing with reference to any infringement of his statutory or constitutional
rights, the right of appeal from the result of such trial is not an inherent or
inalienable right, but must be conferred by constitutional provision or
statute, and that, therefore, the right of appeal from an adverse ruling of th
Board to the court of common pleas is limited to those persons whose in-
terests are subject to adjudication by the Board.
Two defendants in a personal injury case, which finally concluded as
Hurt v. Transp. Co.,6 had filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict following a verdict rendered jointly against them in the trial court.
One motion having been granted and one overruled, the unsuccessful de-
fendant also filed a motion for new trial. Prior to action upon this motion,
the unsuccessful defendant appealed, the cause coming to the supreme court
after the court of appeals dismissed the appeal sua sponte. The supreme
court, basing its decision upon procedural statutes then effective, held that,
where a motion for new trial had been filed, an appeal from a motion for
judgment notwithstanding a verdict before the disposition of the motion
for new trial is premature and the court of appeals may dismiss it either
sua sponte or upon motion. This situation has now been remedied by the
provisions of Ohio Revised Code Section 2323.181.
In Sorge v. Sutton and its companion case,7 which grew out of the dis-
missal of two police officers after hearing before the Cleveland Municipal
Civil Service Commission, the supreme court held that where a statute pro-
vides for appeal from such Commission to a court of common pleas, the word
"appeal" in such statute must be interpreted to mean only a review of the
proceedings before the Commission as to their legality and regularity and
not a trial de novo.
In Schenley v. Kauth, the court held that under Ohio Revised Code
Section 2505.07 (Ohio General Code Section 12223-7), relating to appeals
from the court of common pleas to the court of appeals, after a ruling on a
motion for new trial, the filing of the entry of the order overruling or
sustaining the motion starts the running of the appeal time, and it is not the
"order" but the "entry" of the order which initiates the period within which
an appeal may be taken.
Procedure in the taking of depositions was considered in Gates v. Big
Boy BeveragesY In the course of the taking of depositions the plaintiff re-
fused to answer questions on cross examination; he also refused to conform
with the order of the court of common pleas to do so; and he appealed
G160 Ohio St. 70, 113 N.E.2d 489 (1953).
159 Ohio St. 574, 113 N.E.2d 10 (1953)
160 Ohio St. 109, 113 N.X.2d 625 (1953).
113 N.E.2nd 749 (Ohio App. 1952).
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